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INTRODUCTION 
The “rise of China” has already become cliché among international 
relations scholars and policy analysts. Yet few disagree that the People’s 
Republic of China’s economic, military, and political power has reached 
new heights in recent years.1 It is, therefore, surprising that relatively few 
international law scholars have studied whether and, if so how, the “rise of 
China” is affecting the development and growth of international law. 
Take, for example, the application of the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity to foreign government officials—an area of substantial ferment 
and change. Numerous international authorities have suggested that, under 
international law, government officials cannot invoke the protections of 
sovereign immunity for acts that violate jus cogens norms. The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently relied on this 
international law trend, holding that the “common law of sovereign 
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 1.  See, e.g., John Ikenberry, The Rise of China and the Future of the West, 87 FOREIGN AFF. 23 
(2008).  
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immunity” does not shield former government officials accused of acts 
violating jus cogens from civil lawsuits.2 But although the Fourth Circuit 
cited decisions from the United Kingdom and Italy to support its holding,3 
it did not cite China’s views. This failure, while understandable, suggests 
that the impact of China’s perspective on this key question of international 
law remains small. 
This Essay uses the Fourth Circuit’s holding as an opportunity to 
consider China’s impact on the development of a complex and important 
doctrine of international law. It begins by observing that China’s 
government would likely oppose the jus cogens exception to sovereign 
immunity recognized by the Fourth Circuit. This rejection of a jus cogens 
sovereign immunity exception would not be a matter of pure political 
expediency vulnerable to change with the political winds. Rather, rejecting 
a jus cogens exception to sovereign immunity would be consistent with the 
Chinese government’s long-standing emphasis on the importance of 
sovereign equality under international law. Sovereign equality disapproves 
the notion that any country’s courts can sit in judgment of another equal 
sovereign. China’s commitment to this principle is reflected in its 
adherence to the doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity, despite the 
strong international trend to the contrary. 
There are many examples of China’s insistence on a broad sovereign 
immunity in U.S. courts. For instance, when Chinese government officials 
have become embroiled in U.S. litigation, the Chinese government has 
demanded immunity for all of its government officials, even for alleged jus 
cogens violations. Indeed, in a previous U.S. case involving allegations of 
jus cogens violations by a (non-head-of-state) Chinese government official, 
China demanded (and received) immunity for its government official in 
U.S. court.4 The Chinese government has stated in official diplomatic notes 
that U.S. courts’ failure to grant such immunity would be perceived by the 
Chinese government as a violation of the U.S. government’s international 
law obligations.5 
Although China’s views on international law have rarely influenced 
international law scholars and theorists, China’s vehement opposition to 
any exceptions to sovereign immunity would likely have practical 
 
 2.  Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 773 (4th Cir. 2012).  
 3.  Id. at 776. 
 4.  See Li Weixum v. Bo Xilai, 568 F. Supp. 2d 35, 38–39 (D.D.C. 2008). The question of 
immunity for jus cogens acts was not addressed, however, because the court found that Bo was immune 
under diplomatic (as opposed to sovereign) immunity. See id. at 37. 
 5.  See, e.g., Lewis S. Yelin, Head of State Immunity As Sole Executive Lawmaking, 44 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT'L L. 911, 924 (2011) (describing a U.S. State Department letter stating that the Chinese 
government had asked the U.S. government to act). 
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significance. In a post-Samantar case against a Chinese government 
official, a U.S. court endorsing a jus cogens exception would probably face 
serious Chinese protest and opposition. If such a case were to arise, it 
would represent a fascinating example of how China’s new importance in 
world affairs affects (or perhaps does not affect) the evolution of this 
doctrine in U.S. courts and elsewhere. 
This Essay begins by illustrating that the Samantar litigation 
reaffirmed a series of lower court decisions holding that foreign sovereign 
immunity does not attach to official acts that violate jus cogens. These 
decisions have been important evidence for scholars who claim that such an 
exception to foreign sovereign immunity is now accepted as a rule of 
customary international law. Part II then examines and describes China’s 
views on sovereign immunity, arguing that China’s government will almost 
certainly reject any exception to sovereign immunity for jus cogens. Finally 
the Essay concludes by considering the implications of China’s rejection of 
a jus cogens exception for sovereign immunity on U.S. judicial practice 
post-Samantar and on international law more generally. 
I. THE JUS COGENS EXCEPTION TO FOREIGN SOVEREIGN 
IMMUNITY 
States have long granted immunity from the jurisdiction of their own 
domestic courts to foreign sovereigns. Such immunity is traditionally 
justified by comity and respect for foreign sovereigns, but it has also often 
been understood as a requirement of customary international law.6 The 
precise scope of this immunity, however, has been the subject of much 
discussion and, in many cases, debate. 
The scope of sovereign immunity protection afforded government 
officials—as opposed to the scope of protection afforded the foreign 
government itself—is one area of uncertainty. In the United States, foreign 
heads of state have historically enjoyed “status-based” immunity from U.S. 
jurisdiction.7 Such immunity attaches due to the beneficiary’s “status” as 
head of state, and not due to the type of acts he is claiming immunity for. 
Status-based immunity for heads of state has deep roots in customary 
international law and has received broad acceptance around the world. 
Diplomats, ambassadors, and similar high-level foreign emissaries have 
 
 6.  See, e.g., 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 342 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 
9th ed. 1992); Dexter & Carpenter, Inc. v. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen, 43 F.2d 705, 710 (2d Cir. 1930) 
(describing sovereign immunity rules as part of the “international rule of law.”). 
 7.  See, e.g., Chimène I. Keitner, The Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 14 GREEN 
BAG 2D 61, 63 (2010).  
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also historically enjoyed status-based immunity.8 Such status-based 
immunities attach only while the head of state or diplomat holds office. 
Immunity for other types of government officials, former heads of 
state, and ambassadors has been less certain under international law. 
Indeed, the immunity of these non-head-of-state foreign government 
officials has hardly been considered in U.S. litigation for most of U.S. 
history. To the extent that such officials are afforded immunity, however, it 
is “conduct-based.” This means that officials can invoke immunity only for 
official acts, or acts performed on behalf of the foreign state. Private acts or 
acts inconsistent with the grant of permission or law of the foreign state do 
not fall within this type of immunity. 
In recent years, several jurisdictions around the world have recognized 
an exception to immunity for foreign government officials whose “official” 
acts violated jus cogens norms. Jus cogens norms are certain unusually 
heinous international acts prohibited by all states.9 These jurisdictions 
reasoned that the universal prohibitions contained in jus cogens norms 
meant that no state could legitimately authorize its officials to violate them. 
The leading authority is a decision in which a United Kingdom court lifted 
a foreign government officials’s sovereign immunity protection because his 
alleged acts of torture did not constitute an official act.10 Other jurisdictions 
have also lifted conduct-based immunity for alleged jus cogens violations 
in the criminal context.11 Some U.S. courts followed this trend, finding a 
jus cogens exception to conduct-based immunity and applying the concept 
in the slightly more controversial context of civil litigation.12 
The Fourth Circuit’s decision in the Samantar litigation illustrates the 
importance of the jus cogens exception. In Samantar, plaintiffs alleged that 
a series of jus cogens violations, including torture, were committed by the 
defendant, who had committed the acts while serving both as prime 
 
 8.  Id. at 64. 
 9.  M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: 'Jus Cogens' and 'Obligatio Erga Omnes', L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1996, at 63, 68. 
 10.  See R v. Bartle, ex Parte Pinochet [1999] UKHL 17, [2000] 1 AC 147 (HL) 203–05 (appeal 
taken from Eng.) (concluding that official-acts immunity is unavailable to shield foreign officials from 
prosecution for international crimes because acts of torture do not constitute officially-approved acts).  
 11.  See Curtis A. Bradley & Laurence R. Helfer, International Law and the U.S. Common Law of 
Foreign Official Immunity, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 213, 238–40 (2010). 
 12.  See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1209 (9th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that acts 
in “violation[] of jus cogens norms . . . cannot constitute official sovereign acts”); Siderman de Blake v. 
Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 718 (“International law does not recognize an act that violates jus 
cogens as a sovereign act.”); Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 893 (7th Cir. 2005) (Cudahy, J., 
dissenting) (“[O]fficials receive no immunity for acts that violate international jus cogens human rights 
norms (which by definition are not legally authorized acts).”).  
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minister of and as a leading minister for the Somalian government.13 
Defendant Samantar invoked both head-of-state and conduct-based 
immunity and further argued that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
provided a statutory basis for his immunity.14 The Supreme Court rejected 
Samantar’s statutory argument and remanded his case to lower courts to 
determine whether he enjoyed immunity under the common law of foreign 
sovereign immunity.15 On remand, both the district and appeals courts 
found that Samantar could not invoke immunity.16 Although the district 
court appeared to defer to the executive’s suggestion of non-immunity for 
reasons of foreign relations, the Fourth Circuit squarely held that the 
question of immunity was wholly judicial and largely controlled by the 
customary international law of foreign sovereign immunity.17 
After surveying these international law authorities, the Fourth Circuit 
concluded that “[t]here has been an increasing trend in international law to 
abrogate foreign official immunity for individuals who have commited 
acts, otherwise attributable to the State, that violate jus cogens norms—i.e., 
they have commited international crimes or human rights violations.”18 
Although the Fourth Circuit noted some contrary international authority19 
on the applicability of the jus cogens exception to civil lawsuits, it 
nonetheless concluded that “under international and domestic law, officials 
from other countries are not entitled to foreign official immunity for jus 
cogens violations, even if the acts were performed in the defendant’s 
official capacity.”20 Thus, Samantar could not avail himself of immunity 
and was subject to the U.S. courts’ jurisdiction. 
The Supreme Court did not grant certiorari to review the Fourth 
Circuit’s decision. This leaves the jus cogens exception alive and well as 
part of the common law of sovereign immunity applied by at least some 
U.S. courts.21 The decision also serves to further bolster the argument of 
 
 13.  Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F.3d 371, 373–74 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 326 (2010). 
 16.  See, e.g., Yousuf v. Samantar, No. 1:04CV01360 (LMB/JFA), 2011 WL 7445583 (E.D. Va. 
Feb. 15, 2011), aff'd, 699 F.3d 763 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 17.  Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 776 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 18.  Id.  
 19.  Compare Cass., sez. un., 11 marzo 2004, n. 5044, Foro it. 2004, I (It.) [Ferrini v. Republic of 
Germany] (denying “the functional immunity of foreign state organs” for jus cogens violations in 
criminal context), with Jones v. Saudi Arabia [2006] UKHL 26 [24], [2007] 1 AC 270 (HL) (appeal 
taken from Eng.) (rejecting jus cogens exception to foreign official immunity in civil context). 
 20.  Yousuf, 699 F.3d at 777. 
 21.  Several circuits have held differently, holding that there is no general jus cogens exception to 
sovereign immunity under customary international law. See, e.g., Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9, 14 (2d 
Cir. 2009); Wei Ye v. Jiang Zemin, 383 F.3d 620, 627 (7th Cir. 2004). 
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international law scholars that the jus cogens exception has achieved the 
status of customary international law. 
II. CHINA AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
In its survey of international authorities, the Fourth Circuit considered 
Italian and British authorities on the question of a jus cogens exception for 
foreign government official immunity. The Fourth Circuit did not consider 
Chinese authorities—probably because no court in China had ever ruled on 
the question of a jus cogens exception to sovereign immunity. Yet as I 
explain below, China’s government would almost certainly reject the jus 
cogens exception. This result, as I will explain in Part IV, calls into 
question the correctness of Fourth Circuit’s holding as a matter of 
international law. 
A. China’s View on the Importance of Sovereignty 
Wang Tieya, one of China’s most preeminent international law 
scholars, observed that China has been the most “enthusiastic champion” of 
the principle of sovereignty under international law.22 This enthusiasm 
extends back to China’s announcement of its Five Principles for Peaceful 
Co-Existence in 1954, which declared sovereignty and non-interference in 
the domestic affairs of states to be China’s core principles of international 
law.23 As then-Prime Minister of China Wen Jiabao noted in a 2008 speech 
to the United Nations General Assembly, 
 
China’s persistent stand of the primacy of State sovereignty has its deep 
roots embedded in the miserable experience in its modern history. . . . 
“Respect for sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of 
other countries is the prerequisite for sound State-to-State relations. The 
Chinese people have learned from their modern history of humiliation 




 22.  Wang Tieya, International Law in China: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, 221 
COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACAD. OF INT’L L. 195, 288 (1990).  
 23.  Id. at 263. The Five Principles include: “(a) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity 
and sovereignty; (b) mutual non-aggression; (c) mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs; 
(d) equality and mutual benefit; (e) peaceful co-existence.” Id. 
 24.  Xue Hanqin, Chinese Contemporary Perspectives on International Law: History, Culture, 
and International Law, 355 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACAD. OF INT’L L. 41, 90 (2011) 
(footnote omitted) (quoting H.E. Wen Jiabao, Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of 
China, Statement at the General Debate of the 63rd Session of the U.N. General Assembly 3 (Sept. 24, 
2008), http://www.un.org/ga/63/generaldebate/pdf/china_en.pdf). 
KU FOR PUBLICATION(DO NOT DELETE) 7/9/2016  11:22 PM 
2016 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CHINA’S VIEWS  509 
Thus, for China, the principle of sovereignty is paramount. As China’s 
then-President Hu Jintao stated in his remarks at the Second Round of the 
China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogue, “sovereignty, independence, 
and territorial integrity are a country’s most basic rights recognized by the 
norms governing international relations. To the Chinese people, nothing is 
more important than safeguarding national sovereignty and territorial 
integrity.”25 
 China’s emphasis on the inviolability of sovereignty was echoed by 
newly independent states in the era of decolonization following World War 
II. Despite China’s economic growth and global prominence, many of its 
leaders and scholars still consider it to be a developing country.26 Thus, 
China has continued to associate itself with newly independent states like 
India and has shared its commitment to sovereign equality and 
independence under international law with those states. 
1. China’s Adherence to Absolute Sovereign Immunity 
Given the Chinese government’s repeated, continuous emphasis on 
sovereignty, it is not surprising that China has also “consistently upheld the 
principle of State immunity for the maintenance of legal order and the 
stability of international relations.”27 Summarizing China’s state practice, 
leading Chinese international scholar (and current ICJ member) Xue 
Hanqin stated: 
 
[China] holds absolute immunity in case of acts of foreign States from 
national jurisdiction and execution. It is of the view that the principle of 
immunity is a right of State under customary international law rather 
than [of] comity. . . . In its judicial practice, Chinese national courts have 
neither exercised jurisdiction over acts of foreign States, nor have they 
enforced any decisions involving public property of foreign States.28 
 
China has linked its adherence to the doctrine of absolute sovereign 
immunity to the principle of sovereign equality. Despite the strong 
international trend toward a restrictive theory of immunity,29 China has 
maintained its commitment to absolute immunity. For instance, in a U.S. 
 
 25.  President Hu Jintao, Address at the Second Round of the China-U.S. Strategic and Economic 
Dialogue (May 24, 2010), http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t696949.htm.  
 26.  See Bing Bing Jia, A Synthesis on the Notion of Sovereingyty and the Ideal of the Rule of 
Law: Reflections on the Contemporary Chiense Approach to International Law, 53 GERMAN 
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 11, 20 n. 49 and 52 (2010).  
 27.  Hanqin, supra note 24, at 100.  
 28.  Id. at 100–01 (citing INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CHINA: CASES AND PRACTICE 35 (Duan Jie 
Long ed., 2011 [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CHINA]). 
 29.  Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 319 (2010). 
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case involving creditors seeking to enforce defaulted Chinese government 
bonds in U.S. courts, the government of China sent an aide memoire to the 
U.S. government demanding full immunity even though its bond sales were 
commercial activities not normally granted immunity.30 In this aide-
memoire, China argued that: 
 
[T]he absolute jurisdictional immunity of States in foreign courts is still 
a valid rule under international law on the basis of the principle of 
sovereign equality (par in parem non habet imperium, an equal has no 
power over an equal). So far there has not been enough evidence to 
prove that by State practice and opinio juris, this customary international 
law rule has changed.31 
 
It is worth noting that China’s position in favor of absolute immunity 
appears driven by concerns over the arbitrary and inconsistent application 
of the restrictive theory. As Wang Houli, the leading international lawyer 
serving in China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, explained in 1987: 
 
[I]t is China’s view that the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, 
characterized by classification of state acts into those which are 
“sovereign” and “non-sovereign,” is theoretically unfounded. States, as 
sovereign entities, by definition behave in the capacity of sovereigns. It 
is erroneous to assume that states have dual and different identities. 
Moreover, the distinction between the two kinds of state acts is hardly 
workable in practice because it lacks consistency and precision in 
content, and it provides no common criterion for differentiation.32 
 
When China signed the 2004 Convention on the Jurisdictional Immunities 
of States (which follows the restrictive approach), Chinese scholars hailed 
China’s abandonment of its absolute immunity position. But China never 
ratified the Convention, nor has that Convention come into force due to the 
small number of countries that have ratified it. Still, it was somewhat 
surprising when the Chinese government reaffirmed its adherence to the 
absolute immunity position in 2011. 
In Democratic Republic of Congo v. FG Hemisphere Associates,33 the 
Chinese government required Hong Kong courts to abandon the restrictive 
 
 30.  Aide Memoire from Wu Xuequian, Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, to George Shultz, 
U.S. Secretary of State (Feb. 10, 1983), reprinted in 22 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 81, 81 (1983). 
 31.  Hanqin, supra note 24, at 102 (citing INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CHINA, supra note 28, at 36). 
 32.  Wang Houli, Sovereign Immunity: Chinese Views and Practices, 1 J. CHINESE L. 23, 29 
(1987). 
 33.  Democratic Republic of the Congo v. FG Hemisphere Assocs., [2011] 14 H.K.C.F.A.R. 395, 
¶¶ 62, 502–12 (C.F.A.) (H.K.). 
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theory that had been in effect during the British period, and to grant 
sovereign immunity to a foreign state involved in a commercial dispute 
with private creditors.34 Thus, China today appears to have continued to 
endorse absolute immunity. 
2. Foreign Government Official Immunity and the Jus cogens 
Exception 
Like most states, China roots the immunity of its government officials 
in the sovereign immunity enjoyed by foreign states. Chinese government 
officials have faced several lawsuits in U.S. courts under the Alien Tort 
Statute. This U.S. law has been used by Chinese nationals to sue Chinese 
government officials for alleged complicity in torture and other human 
rights abuses.35 In such lawsuits filed against Chinese government officials, 
the Chinese government has not participated in the litigation by appearing 
in court.  Instead, the Chinese government has demanded that the U.S. 
government block the lawsuit based on the sovereign immunity due to 
Chinese officials.36 Such demands were not affected by the fact that the 
government officials were accused of jus cogens violations.37 
The Chinese government’s filings on behalf of its then-Minister of 
Commerce Bo Xilai in 2006 revealed how China reacted to a lawsuit 
against its government officials. In Li Weixum v. Bo Xilia, a Falun Gong 
practitioner, alleged that Bo had authorized the torture of Falun Gong 
practitioners in China.38 Bo was served with papers during his participation 
in a U.S. government sponsored conference on U.S.-China trade.39 In the 
position paper that it sent to the U.S. Department of State explaining the 
basis for its demand for action, the Chinese government invoked sovereign 
immunity for Bo, noting that the doctrine is a “universally recognized norm 
of international law.”40 Despite the allegations of jus cogens violations, the 
 
 34.  Id.; see also Yilin Ding, Absolute, Restrictive, or Something More: Did Beijing Choose the 
Right Type of Sovereign Immunity for Hong Kong?, 26 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 997, 997–98 (2012). 
 35.  See, e.g., Plaintiffs A, B, C, D, E, F v. Jiang Zemin, 282 F. Supp. 2d 875, 879 (N.D. Ill. 
2003), aff'd sub nom. Wei Ye v. Jiang Zemin, 383 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 36.  See, e.g., Yelin, supra note 5, at 924 (describing a U.S. State Department letter stating that the 
Chinese government had asked the U.S. government to act).  
 37.  See Li Weixum v. Bo Xilai, 568 F. Supp. 2d 35, 36 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 38.  Id. at 36 n. 2. 
 39.  Id. at 36. 
 40.  Position of the Chinese Government on the Assault and Attempted Frame-up by “Falun 
Gong” Against Minister Bo Xilai 17, transmitted by Letter from Liu Zhenmin, Dir. Gen. of the Chinese 
Dep’t of Treaty & Law, to William Taft, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State (Aug. 23, 2004), 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/98830.pdf. 
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government warned that failure to dismiss the case could seriously harm 
U.S.-China relations.41 
Although the jus cogens exception was not considered in the Chinese 
statement in the Weixum v. Bo case, Chinese scholars have noted the trend 
toward lifting sovereign immunity protections for international jus cogens 
violations.42 Not surprisingly, Chinese scholars have been critical of this 
approach, at least with respect to state criminal jurisdiction.43 In lauding the 
ICJ’s decision in the Arrest Warrant case, Judge Xue stated that “the legal 
certainty [provided] by distinguishing the immunity rule from substantive 
law . . . is conducive to the development of international humanitarian law 
and human rights law,”44 but simultaneously preserves the immunity 
principle that “touches on the foundation of the State system and 
fundamental principles of international law: sovereign equality and non-
interference.”45 
It is worth noting that Chinese scholars and officials have aimed their 
criticism at individual states exercising criminal jurisdiction for jus cogens 
violations, rather than at international organizations. Thus, the Chinese 
representative at the 63rd Session of the General Assembly’s Sixth 
Committee addressed the work of a special rapporteur on foreign 
government official immunity and noted that: 
 
[I]mmunity from foreign State criminal jurisdiction and criminal 
jurisdiction of international judicial institutions are two distinct legal 
issues. . . . [T]he fact that one State establishes jurisdiction over certain 
crimes under international law doesn’t imply that foreign State officials 
automatically lose their immunity in relation to such crimes in the 
domestic court of the said state. . . . [E]xceptions to immunity of State 
officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction have the potential to be 
abused and misused as a tool for politically motivated prosecution. And 
in such an event, it will . . . lose its usefulness in fighting crimes and 
protecting human rights . . . .46 
 
 41.  Id. at 20. 
 42.  李损, Li Sun 论政府官员在国家豁免中的地位问题 [On the Status of Government Officials 
Under State Immunity]， 法法法法法 [Legal System and Society](May 2010) (noting the international 
trend toward greater limitations on government officials’ exercise of sovereign immunity with respect 
to private actions, violations of domestic law, and violations of international crimes). 
 43.  Wang Xiumei, The Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, 30 J. OF 
XIAN JIAOTONG UNIV. 67 (2010). 
 44.  Hanqin, supra note 24, at 103. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Liu Zhenmin, Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the U.N., Statement at the Sixth 
Committee of the 63rd Session of the U.N. General Assembly, on Item 75: Report of the International 
Law Commission on the Work of its 60th Session (Nov. 3, 2008), http://www.china-un.org/eng/hyyfy/ 
t520980.htm.  
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China’s representative criticized the way in which some states have 
manipulated immunity exceptions, a practice which will “have a serious 
impact on stable relations among states.”47 
In other words, China’s objection to the jus cogens exception to 
sovereign immunity lies not in a belief that international crimes are not 
serious or deserving of punishment. Rather, its objection is to the 
possibility that individual states might abuse domestic judicial processes 
and undermine China’s sovereign independence and equality. Such crimes 
would, presumably, be more appropriately handled at the international level 
by an international court. This position was confirmed by a Chinese 
delegate’s recent remarks to the General Assembly’s Sixth Committee 
during a discussion on universal jurisdiction: 
 
The Chinese delegation wishes to reiterate that a state must strictly 
follow international law in establishing and exercising universal 
jurisdiction. With the exception of piracy, there exist currently notable 
differences and controversies among member states on whether universal 
jurisdiction exists in other cases and on its scope and application 
conditions.48 
 
Thus, “[i]n the absence of an international consensus on the definition, 
scope, and application of universal jurisdiction, states should refrain from 
going beyond the current international law and seeking to unilaterally claim 
and exercise universal jurisdiction not explicitly permitted by the current 
international law.”49 
This position may or may not be persuasive. But it is a good faith 
defense of sovereign immunity, even for jus cogens violations, rooted in 
China’s historical insistence on sovereign equality and independence. It is 
not merely a matter of political expediency or even pure ideology. As 
Judge Xue explains, 
 
China reserves its position on the principles of sovereignty and non-
interference, because it believes that sovereignty, in the final analysis, is 
not so much about the concept itself . . . ; it is a claim about the way in 
which how different political and social systems, different forms of 
 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Zhou Wu, Chinese Delegate to the U.N., Statement at the 70th Session of the U.N. General 
Assembly on Agenda Item 86: The Scope and Application of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction 
(Oct. 20, 2015), http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/legalaffairs/sixthcommittee1/t1307695.htm.  
 49.  Id.  
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civilization and culture should correlate and treat each other in 
international relations.50 
CONCLUSION: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CHINA’S REJECTION OF 
THE JUS COGENS EXCEPTION TO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
When it concluded that international law recognizes a jus cogens 
exception to sovereign immunity, the Fourth Circuit considered various 
international sources. It did not, however, consider China’s views on the 
issue. This is understandable given the lack of Chinese judicial authority on 
the question. But as this Essay has demonstrated, China’s long-standing 
“enthusiasm” for sovereign equality has led China to adopt the broadest, 
most absolutist form of sovereign immunity doctrine imaginable. This 
position rejects restrictive immunity for commercial activities and would 
reject a jus cogens exception to sovereign immunity for the same reasons. 
Allowing a departure from absolute sovereign immunity, in the eyes of the 
current Chinese government, would undermine China’s hard-won 
sovereign equality and independence. 
But do China’s views on this question matter? While China is a rising 
global power, it is not yet clear that China’s views can overcome the strong 
trend in the U.S. and Europe in the opposite direction.  At the same time, 
the different reaction of the U.S. government to the Samantar case versus 
prior Chinese government official cases is instructive. In Samantar, the 
U.S. government actually determined that Samantar should not receive 
immunity because, among other things, the current government of Somalia 
did not acknowledge responsibility for his alleged acts.  As Somalia did not 
have a single government at that time and had been in and out of civil war 
for decades, the U.S. did not have to fear negative repercussions in foreign 
relations. 
China is a different story. From the Huguang railway bonds case in the 
early 1980s to the Bo ATS lawsuit in 2006, China has consistently 
demanded immunity for its government officials from any and all U.S. 
litigation. While the U.S. government’s executive cannot force courts to 
adopt China’s absolutist view of sovereign immunity outside of the head of 
state context, the U.S. did find ways to achieve China’s goals through other 
legal doctrines. One would expect the U.S. government to find similar legal 
loopholes in future cases, but it is possible that a Chinese government 
official could again be subject to a lawsuit for alleged jus cogens violations. 
Could the U.S. (with China’s criticism ringing in its ears) really allow a 
court to lift China’s immunity for actions of its government officials? 
 
 50.  Hanqin, supra note 24, at 106. 
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If China’s views were taken seriously, courts in the U.S. might be 
much less likely to find the existence of an international law consensus on 
the jus cogens exception. China opposes a jus cogens exception, and it 
maintains a robust and absolute conception of sovereignty. This insistence 
suggests that a global consensus on a jus cogens exception to sovereign 
immunity may remain out of reach, despite the contrary conclusions 
reached by the Fourth Circuit and numerous scholars. 
 
